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Abstract
We experimentally study decentralized organizational learning. Our objective is
to understand how learning members of an organization cope with the confounding
eﬀects of the simultaneous learning of others. We test the predictions of a stylized,
rational agent model of organizational learning that provides sharp predictions as to
how learning members of an organization might cope with the simultaneous learning
of others as a function of fundamental variables, e.g., ﬁrm size and the discount factor.
While the problem of learning while others are learning is quite diﬃcult, we ﬁnd support
for the comparative static predictions of the model’s unique symmetric equilibrium.
JEL classiﬁcation numbers: C72, C73, C92, D23, D83.
Keywords: Coordination problems, decentralization, experiments, learning, organiza-
tional behavior, symmetry.
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D’Angelo, Charles Kannair and Scott Kinross provided expert research assistance.“If one’s own actions are embedded in an ecology of the actions of many others
(who are simultaneously learning and changing), it is not easy to understand
what is going on. The relationship between the actions of individuals in the or-
ganization and overall organizational performance is confounded by simultaneous
learning of other actors.” —Daniel A. Levinthal and James G. March (1993, p.
97).
In this paper we experimentally study decentralized organizational learning. We look at
teams, the smallest organizational unit and formulate a team—learning problem that is de-
centralized in that members of the team make their decisions independently. Team members
have common interests and their objective is to discover through trial and error which of the
combinations of team members’ actions yield a positive payoﬀ, without being able to either
communicate with other team members or to observe their actions.
We are interested in how learning members of a team cope with the confounding eﬀects
of the simultaneous learning of other team members.1 This issue is a recurrent theme in
the literature on organizational learning, e.g., Pertti H. Lounamaa and James G. March
(1987) and Daniel A. Levinthal and James G. March (1993). It arises because, unless there
is either unrestricted communication or perfect observability, it can be diﬃcult to attribute
success or failure to combinations of actions taken by diﬀerent members of the organiza-
tion. For example, innovations in a ﬁrm’s research and development department may be
falsely regarded as ineﬀective, only because they are not eﬀectively communicated to and
matched by changes in the marketing department. Indeed, Clayton M. Christensen (1997)
documents how a lack of communication between engineers and marketing departments at
companies manufacturing computer disk drives led to the failure of some of the more estab-
lished manufacturers. Similar failures to communicate, e.g., between nurses and physicians
or within nursing teams, are cited by Amy C. Edmondson (2004) for the frequent lack of
learning from failure in healthcare organizations. One of the key ﬁndings from Edmondson’s
empirical study is that “process failures in hospitals have systemic causes, often originat-
ing in diﬀerent groups or departments from where the failure is experienced, and so learning
from them requires cross departmental communication and collaboration.” Our experimental
team—learning task captures this lack of communication and observability as starkly as pos-
1An organization is any collection of individuals linked by a common purpose, Douglass C. North (1994).
This includes naturalistic organizations (like ﬁrms, plants), but also teams, and groups (within a ﬁrm). In
our experimental investigation, we focus on groups of agents in the laboratory. As Linda Argote (1999, p. 99)
notes, “understanding how groups or teams learn to work eﬀectively together provides the micro foundation
for organizational learning because groups or teams are the building blocks of most organizations.”
1sible. Furthermore, we compare multiplayer team—learning with individual learning, where
communication and observability constraints are removed.
Much of the work on organizational learning follows Herbert A. Simon’s (1947) and
Richard M. Cyert and March’s (1963) views that the organization is composed of boundedly
rational agents. The question then is how such organizations perform as a function of certain
exogenously speciﬁed individual learning rules. For example, Richard H. Day and E. Herbert
Tinney (1968) study decentralized learning in a ﬁrm with two independent decision makers
who respond to success or failure by modifying their decision rules until a satisﬁcing criterion
is met. Day and Tinney examine the roles of “caution,” “daring” and “failure response” and
show that “learning - tempered by caution in response to failure” can eventually solve the
ﬁrm’s problem. Outside of economics, computer scientists have shown considerable interest
in boundedly rational concurrent learning in multi-agent environments.2
Our approach toward obtaining theoretical predictions, based on Andreas Blume and
April M. Franco (2007), is novel in the organizational learning literature as we consider fully
rational agents and use an explicit game theoretic framework. Rather than exogenously
specifying individual learning rules, we predict learning behavior and tie our predictions to
parameters governing individual preferences as well as to properties of organizations. Thus,
by contrast with the bounded rationality approach where the focus is on learning an equilib-
rium, we investigate learning in equilibrium. Using the terminology of Day and Tinney, we
can predict agents’ “caution,” “daring” and “failure response” from their equilibrium val-
ues. This novel approach complements the traditional approach to decentralized learning in
organization theory and multi-agent learning in computer science of exogenously specifying
learning rules for individual agents. Our model yields sharp, testable predictions about be-
havior in the organization and about how this behavior varies with the fundamental variables
that characterize the organization.3
Our focus is on a benchmark environment characterized by decentralized learning. In
this benchmark environment, there is no room for explicit coordination, and due to limited
2For example, Sandip Sen and Mahendra Sekaran (1998) investigate reinforcement learning in multi-agent
systems.
3Fully rational learning in strategic settings is also investigated in the literature on many-agent versions
of the multi-armed bandit problem, Patrick Bolton and Christopher Harris (1999), games with unknown
payoﬀ distributions, Thomas Wiseman (2005), and the literature on informational herding, e.g., Abhijit V.
Banerjee (1992) and Sushil Bikchandani, David Hirshleifer and Ivo Welch (1992). Our environment diﬀers
f r o mt h o s ee x a m i n e di nt h e s ep a p e r sd u et oo u rf o c u so nh o wa g e n t sw i t hc o m m o ni n t e r e s t sc o o r d i n a t et h e i r
learning activities when there are constraints on their ability to communicate and to observe each others’
actions.
2information feedback, there is little room for tacit coordination. This implements some of
the important hurdles faced by Jacob Marschak’s (1960) “several-person ﬁrm,” where each
decision maker “decides about diﬀerent things and on the basis of diﬀerent information.”
Organizations have a multitude of coping strategies for dealing with the problems arising
from decentralized decision making (and dispersed information). Nevertheless, some of the
decision making in an organization will remain decentralized. Also, we are likely to better
understand the coping strategies and their value, by ﬁrst studying the extreme of no explicit
coordination.
In the theoretical analysis for our environment, decentralization is captured through
explicit constraints on agents’ equilibrium strategies. We base our predictions on those
equilibria that make no initial role distinctions among agents, on the grounds that such role
distinctions are unlikely to be achieved without some explicit coordination mechanism. This
approach, which models absence of a common language that could be used to distinguish roles
by requiring that strategies respect the symmetries of players and actions, was pioneered by
Vincent P. Crawford and Hans Haller (1990) and further developed by Blume (2000), Francis
Kramarz (1996), V. Bhaskar (2000) and Steve Alpern and Diane J. Reyniers (2000).4 In
future work we intend to use this benchmark environment as a platform for investigating
routines, communication, information systems, culture, etc. in organizations. For example,
in our environment, there are eﬃcient routines that rely on role distinctions among agents.
Our principal experimental ﬁnding is that in their own learning behavior agents appear
to take into account the confounding eﬀects of the simultaneous learning of others. The
data suggest that agents’ learning behavior is sensitive to both group size and induced time
preference. The direction of these comparative statics eﬀects, although not their magnitude,
is as predicted by theory.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we brieﬂy review the theory that motivates
our experiment and describe the behavior predicted by theory. In Section 3 we describe
our experimental design. Section 4 summarizes our predictions and Section 5 reports the
aggregate experimental results. In section 6 we examine the extent to which three diﬀerent
behavioral models might explain our aggregate ﬁndings, and in section 7 we brieﬂye x p l o r e
individual behavior. Conclusions are oﬀered in section 8.
4In the experimental literature symmetry constraints of this type have been studied by Blume, Douglas
V. DeJong, Yong-Gwan Kim and Geoﬀrey B. Sprinkle (1998, 2001), Blume and Uri Gneezy (2000, 2001),
and Roberto A. Weber and Colin F. Camerer (2001). Weber and Camerer use a language construction
experiment to study conﬂicting organizational cultures in the laboratory.
3I. A Model of Decentralized Learning
Our experimental treatments implement a class of learning situations analyzed in Blume
and Franco (2007). They consider a game in which a collection of agents jointly try to ﬁnd
an optimal action combination in the face of limited information feedback, without being
able to communicate and without reliance on ap r i o r irole distinctions. In this section we
describe this game and the solution of the game that gives us our experimental predictions.
In the search-for-success game, n players repeatedly play a stage game in which each
player has an identical number, m, of actions. All action combinations are either failures
or successes. The (normalized) payoﬀ for each player in the organization from a failure is
zero and from a success is one. There are k success proﬁles and the remaining proﬁles are
failures. Each assignment of the k successes to proﬁles is equally likely. Players know k but
not the assignment of successes to proﬁles.
In the repeated game the random assignment of successes to action proﬁl e si sd e t e r m i n e d
once-and-for-all before the ﬁrst play of the game. The stage game is repeated in rounds
t =1 ,...,T,until either a success is played once or the time horizon T is reached. Players
only observe their own actions and their own payoﬀs, not the actions of the other players.
Players maximize the expected present discounted value of future payoﬀsw i t hd i s c o u n t
factor δ, where δ>0. I nt h ee x p e r i m e n ti ti sc o n v e n i e n tt op e r m i tv a l u e so fδ>1i no r d e r
to generate salient payoﬀ diﬀerences; this can be interpreted as the learning task becoming
more productive over time.
Decentralization is captured through a symmetry constraint on agents’ joint strategies. In
our setting players are ap r i o r iidentical, i.e. they have identical action sets, information, and
payoﬀ functions. Furthermore, there is no pre-play communication or alternative mechanism
that could help to desymmetrize players. Since there is nothing that distinguishes players
ap r i o r i ,we believe it is natural to expect that players hold identical beliefs about each
other at the beginning of the games. Speciﬁcally, we study optimal symmetric strategies
and symmetric equilibrium strategies in the repeated game. This approach was pioneered
by Crawford and Haller (1990).
In the general framework, one can show that for any set of parameters and any length of
the game, optimal symmetric strategies exist and that optimal symmetric strategies are Nash
equilibria. One can also show that optimal symmetric strategies are complex. There does not
exist a symmetric public Nash equilibrium. In the inﬁnite horizon game, any length of time
4before a success is found has positive probability. Optimal symmetric strategies can never
be either completely deterministic or completely random. A central property of a solution
is that agents invest in desymmetrization. In particular, they sacriﬁce current payoﬀsi n
order to increase the likelihood of reaching an asymmetric history: Even before players have
exhausted all of their actions, they will with positive probability return to action proﬁles
they have visited before.
For the purpose of the experiment, we will focus on three—round versions of the game
in which each agent has m = 2 actions. In that case one can show that the game has
a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium. As in the general case, in this equilibrium both
random switching and deterministic switching are part of the equilibrium strategy. Blume
and Franco (2007) show that the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium has the following form:
In the ﬁrst round, agents randomize uniformly over their two actions. In the second round















which depends on the discount factor δ, the number of agents n, and the number of success
proﬁles, k. In the third round they switch with probability q0 = 1, if they didn’t switch in
the previous round, and with probability q1 =0 .5 if they did switch in the previous round.
The intuition underlying this solution is easily understood in the two-player, two-action
case. Refer to the two players as player A and player B (only for record keeping purposes,
without implying any asymmetry among the players). In the third round, conditional on
not having switched before, it is clearly optimal for player A to switch with probability
q0 = 1 since this is the only way to be entirely sure that a new action combination will be
examined. Conditional on having switched before, player A faces two possibilities. The ﬁrst
possibility is that player B has not switched. Then by the argument just given, player B will
switch in the third round with probability one, guaranteeing that a new action combination
will be examined, irrespective of player A’s choice. The other possibility is that player
B has switched. In that case if both players use identical switching probabilities q1, it
is easily seen that the value of this switching probability that maximizes the probability
of a novel action proﬁle is q1 =0 .5. The remaining question is why agents randomize with
non-degenerate probabilities in the second round. Observe that there cannot be a symmetric
equilibrium in which both agents switch with probability one in round two. Otherwise player
5A could simply stay put in round two and then switch with probability one in round three.
This deviation would guarantee that in each round a novel action proﬁle would be visited.
Therefore the deviation would be proﬁtable, breaking the putative equilibrium. Since in this
game an optimal symmetric strategy has to be an equilibrium, this argument also shows that
probability-one switching in the second round cannot be optimal (provided that δ>0).
From the explicit formula for p∗(δ,n,k) we can derive a number of interesting testable
comparative statics predictions: p∗(δ,n,k) is (1) strictly decreasing in δ, (2) strictly decreas-
ing in n, (3) strictly decreasing in n even if k
2n is kept constant and (4) strictly increasing in
k.
II. Experimental Design
In our experiment participants repeatedly play a search-for-success game. Each experimental
session involved sixteen periods o fp l a y .I ne a c hp e r i o d ,s u b j e c t sp l a y e dathree-round search-
for-success game. Before the beginning of any period, participants are randomly (re)matched
into groups of ﬁxed size. During a period, all participants belonging to the same group played
the three-round search-for-success game with one another.
We employ a 3 × 2 experimental design. The ﬁrst treatment variable is the number of
individuals who participate as a team to play the search for success game, either 1 individual
“singles”, 2 individuals, “pairs” or 3 individuals, “triples”. This allows us to investigate (a)
the distinction between individual and organizational learning and (b) whether individual
learning within an organization is sensitive to the size of that organization. For each of these
three treatment variables, we consider a second treatment variable, the order in which we
vary the discount factor: eight periods with a high discount factor followed by eight periods
with a low discount factor (high-low), or the reverse order (low-high). The precise details of
our parameterization of the model and experimental design are provided in Table 1
Representatively for the six treatments consider the details of the pairs-low-high treat-
ment. In each of the two sessions of this treatment a cohort of 20 students were recruited
from the undergraduate population of the University of Pittsburgh. None of these students
had prior experience with any of the treatments in this experiment. The students were
randomly assigned to separate computer terminals and received written instructions. The
instructions for the experiment were read aloud to the students to make them common
6Design Team Size Treatments
Choice Singles Pairs Triples
Number of players on a team (n) 1 2 3
Number of action choices (m) 4 2 2
Number of success proﬁles (k) 1 1 2
Number of rounds per game (T) 3 3 3
Number of sessions with low-high
order: δ =0 .5, δ =6 † 2 2 2
Number of sessions with high-low
order: δ =6 ,δ =0 .5‡ 2 2 2
Number of subjects per session 10 20 15
Number of teams per session 10 10 5
Total number of subjects 40 80 60
Total number of teams 40 40 20
†Each session consists of eight 3-round periods with δ =0 .5 followed by eight 3-round periods with δ =6 .
‡Each session consists of eight 3-round periods with δ = 6 followed by eight 3-round periods with δ =0 .5.
Table 1: Characteristics of Experimental Sessions
information.5 P r i o rt ot h es t a r to fp e r i o d1 ,s u b j e c t sw e r er a n d o m l ym a t c h e di n t o1 0p a i r s .
During period 1 each pair played a three-round search-for-success game in which each indi-
vidual chose between two actions, X and Y . Subjects were informed that their initial choice,
say (X,Y), was payoﬀ-irrelevant and only served to determine the remaining three proﬁles,
here (X,X),(Y,X),(Y,Y), each of which was then equally likely to be the unique success
proﬁle, k =1 . 6 P l a y e r sw e r ei n f o r m e do ft h i sp r o c e d u re for selecting the success outcome,
but were not told which of the three outcomes had been chosen as the success outcome.
Consistent with the theory, players were not given any information about the choice of their
m a t c hi nt h eﬁrst round or in any subsequent round of the game. They did, of course, know
the action they chose in each round. In the second round participants were prompted via
their computer terminal to enter the probability with which they would switch from their
ﬁrst-round choice of X or Y to the other choice. Players could specify any probability in [0,1]
(up to six digits) representing the probability with which they would like to switch. Players
5T h ei n s t r u c t i o n su s e di nt h i st r e a t m e n ta n dt h eo t h e rﬁve treatments (along with other supporting
materials) are provided in the web appendix to this paper.
6T h er e a s o nw em a d et h eﬁrst round payoﬀ irrelevant is that we wanted to maximize the number of
observations we obtained on individual decisions regarding action choices in the search-for-success game.
While our decision to make the ﬁrst round payoﬀ irrelevant should not aﬀect the second and third round
behavior of rational agents, it remains an open question whether this is in fact the case.
7were informed that a choice of 0 insured that no switch would occur, while a choice of 1
insured that a switch in action would deﬁnitely occur. A choice in (0,1) meant that a switch
would occur if a random number drawn by the computer program was less than or equal to
the player’s chosen cut-oﬀ value; otherwise no switch would occur.7 After all players had
speciﬁed their round 2 switching probabilities, the computer program determined whether
each player switched or not. Each player was then informed of their own action choice for
round 2 and whether they and their partner had achieved the success outcome in round 2.
If the success proﬁle was chosen, both participants in that pair received a payoﬀ of $1, which
ended their search-for-success game for that period. Otherwise they proceeded to round
three and were prompted, via their computer monitor, to enter the probability with which
they switched their action from their second-round choice to the other choice. Following
submission of this probability, they were informed only of their own action choice for round
3. If a pair of players’ choices resulted in ﬁnding the success proﬁle in the third round, both
received a payoﬀ of δ$1 = $0.50 as we chose to set δ =0 .5 in this treatment. Otherwise both
received a payoﬀ of $0. Following the third round of the ﬁrst period that period was declared
over; all participants were randomly rematched into pairs and proceeded to play the same
three-round search-for-success game in period two in their new pairings. The computer
program ensured that a player’s match in the current three-round game (period) diﬀered
from his match in the previous three-round game (period) and this fact was made known to
subjects. This pattern was repeated for eight periods. Following completion of the eighth
period, subjects were instructed that for the remaining eight periods (three-round games)
the discount factor would be raised to δ = 6 so that achievement of the success proﬁle in
round two continued to pay $1 while a third-round success now paid $6. The change in δ was
not announced until the start of the ninth period. The new discount factor was in eﬀect for
the remaining eight periods of the session (periods 9-16). At the end of the session, subjects
were paid their earnings from all 16 periods (3-round games) played in cash in addition to a
guaranteed $5 show-up fee.
The diﬀerences in the remaining ﬁve treatments were as follows (see also Table 1):
In the high-low treatments, the discount factor was 6 in the ﬁrst eight periods and .5
in the second eight periods. In the singles treatments (n = 1), each individual plays
7While it was not necessary to provide subjects with a randomization device, and it may have encouraged
subjects to randomize more than they otherwise would have chosen to, we nevertheless thought the beneﬁts
of providing such a device, given that the symmetric equilibrium typically involves playing a mixed strategy,
outweighed any costs.
8alone, and instead of choosing between actions X and Y he chooses among the proﬁles
(X,X),(X,Y),(Y,X),(Y,Y), that is m = 4 rather than 2. As in the pairs treatment there
is a single success outcome (k = 1) in the singles treatment. In the triples treatments (n =3 ) ,
members of each three-player group choose between X and Y (m = 2) and, instead of one
success proﬁle, there are two, k = 2; the latter choice keeps the ratio of k to mn constant
across treatments.
The average payoﬀ across all treatments and all sessions earned by subjects, including
the $5 show up fee, was $25.37 for an experimental session that lasted approximately 75
minutes.
III. Predictions
In this section we describe the point predictions of the theory for our experimental treatments
and use these to formulate hypotheses regarding the comparative statics eﬀects of changing
the number of players n and the discount factor δ, and about the relative magnitude of
conditional and unconditional switching probabilities.
For the singles treatment, the formula from section 2 does not apply, but the optimal
solution is easily derived. If an individual has not achieved a success in round two it is
clearly optimal to switch with probability one in round three, regardless of whether there
was a switch in round two or not, i.e. q0 = q1 =1 . Given these conditional switching





probability of a success in round two, and 1
2 is the probability of a success in round three
conditional on not having succeeded in round two. In contrast, the expected payoﬀ from not
switching in round two equals 0 + 1
3δ,w h i c hs h o w st h a tw i t hn =1 , switching is preferable
to not switching regardless of the discount factor. Therefore we have: For n =1 ,k=1a n d
any positive δ, theory predicts the vector of switching probabilities (p,q0,q 1)=( 1 ,1,1).
For the pairs treatment the unconditional switching probability p can be calculated as a
function of δ from the formula in section 2. Recall the conditional switching probabilities
q0 =1a n dq1 =0 .5 in this case are independent of δ. This gives us: For n =2 ,k=1
and δ =0 .5 theory predicts the vector of switching probabilities (p,q0,q 1)=( 0 .8,1,0.5). For
n =2 ,k=1a n dδ = 6 theory predicts the vector of switching probabilities (p,q0,q 1)=
(0.25,1,0.5).
For the triples treatment, we can once again calculate p from the formula in section 2
9and the conditional switching probabilities do not vary with δ. Therefore, in this case, theory
gives us the point predictions: For n =3 ,k=2a n dδ =0 .5 theory predicts the vector of
switching probabilities (p,q0,q 1)=( 0 .748,1,0.5). For n =3 ,k=2a n dδ = 6 theory predicts
the vector of switching probabilities (p,q0,q 1)=( 0 ,1,0.5).
Inspired by these point predictions we formulate the following comparative statics
hypotheses: (1) Keeping the discount factor ﬁxed, the second-round switching probability
p is decreasing in the number of players, n. This main hypothesis captures the idea that
learning individuals in an organization account for the simultaneous learning of others by
switching (exploring) less often as the team size grows. (2) Fixing the number of players at
either n =2or n =3 , the second-round switching probability p, is decreasing in the discount
factor δ. This second hypothesis tests whether variations in the payoﬀ to achieving a success
aﬀect subjects’ behavior; if the future matters little, then players should switch immediately
(in round 2) but otherwise it may pay to wait (until round 3). (3) The conditional switching
probabilities in round 3 (q0, q1) should be invariant to changes in n>1 or the discount
factor. This third hypothesis is both a counterpoint to hypothesis 2 as well as a test of
individual rationality.
IV. Experimental Findings
In this section we report our main experimental ﬁndings and relate them to the theoretical
predictions.8 We start by examining the aggregate data on second-round switching proba-
bilities — the p’s. This addresses our central comparative statics hypotheses stated in the
previous section that the second-round switching probability is decreasing in organizational
size as well as in the discount factor. We then proceed with reporting the session level
data for the two-agent, three-agent and individual-agent treatments. Here, in addition to
the p’s, we report the conditional, third-round, switching probabilities, i.e. the probability
of switching in round three conditional on not having switched in round two, q0,a n dt h e
probability of switching in round three conditional on having switched in round two, q1.F o r
each number n =1 ,2,3 of agents, we test for diﬀerences in the p’s between treatments with
diﬀerent discount factors and for diﬀerences between q0 and q1. Then, ﬁxing the discount
factor, we test for diﬀerences in the p’s and q’s between treatments. We then examine aggre-
gate behavior over time and ask whether behavior changes dramatically with changes in the
8All data from our experimental sessions are provided in the web appendix.
10δ Grouping (n) Predicted Session 1 Session 2 Session 3 Session 4 Mean 1—4
0.5 Singles 1.000 0.940 0.955 0.781 0.825 0.875
0.5 Pairs 0.800 0.657 0.561 0.555 0.767 0.635
0.5 Triples 0.750 0.465 0.486 0.514 0.622 0.522
6.0 Singles 1.000 0.816 0.861 0.761 0.759 0.799
6.0 Pairs 0.250 0.454 0.417 0.483 0.352 0.427
6.0 Triples 0.000 0.302 0.438 0.221 0.316 0.320
Table 2: Predicted and observed mean round-2 switching probabilities across treatments
discount factor and whether there is an order eﬀect depending on the sequence of change in




Figure 1 shows the second-round switching probabilities for each treatment. The top
panel displays the round-2 switching probabilities predicted by theory and the mean round-
2 switching probabilities of the subjects for the case where δ =0 .5 for individuals, pairs and
triples. The bottom panel does the same for δ = 6. The data averages reported in Figure 1
are over all 8 periods of all four sessions of a given treatment.
While the means of the observed round-2 switching probabilities do not coincide with
the theoretical predictions, the comparative statics predictions of the theory are supported
by the data. Our ﬁrst main experimental ﬁnding is that, in line with our comparative
statics hypotheses, the observed round-two switching probability decreases as the size of the
organization increases. When δ = .5, the respective mean switching probabilities are 87.5
percent for singles (individuals) 63.5 percent for pairs and 52.2 percent for triples. When
δ =6 , the mean switching probability falls from 79.9 percent in the individual case to 42.7
percent in the pairs case and 32.0 percent in the triples case.
The results presented in Figure 1 are disaggregated by experimental session in Table 2.
Using the four session-level means for each treatment, a robust rank order test conﬁrms
that round-2 switching probabilities are signiﬁcantly lower in the pairs treatment than in
11the singles treatment (p ≤ .05) when δ = .5o rw h e nδ =6 . 9 Similarly, using the session
level data we also ﬁnd that the round-2 switching probabilities are signiﬁcantly lower in the
triples treatment than in the pairs treatment (p ≤ .05) when δ = .5o rw h e nδ =6 . T h i s
evidence suggests that participants take into account the confounding eﬀects of simultaneous
learning.
Our second main experimental ﬁnding is that in line with our comparative statics hy-
potheses in the pairs and triples treatments, the observed second-round switching probabil-
ities decrease as we induce participants to be more patient by changing the discount factor
from 0.5 to 6. For the pairs treatment, the predicted probability of switching in the second
round is 80 percent when δ =0 .5 and falls to 25 percent when δ =6 .I nt h ee x p e r i m e n t a l
data, the mean second round switching probability is 63.5 percent when δ =6a n df a l l st o
42.7 percent when δ =0 .5. Using the four session-level means for each treatment given in
Table 1, this diﬀerence is signiﬁcant (p = .05). Similarly, for the triples treatment, the pre-
dicted probability of switching in the second round is 75 percent when δ =0 .5a n df a l l st o0
percent when δ = 6. In the experimental data, the mean second round switching probability
is 52.2 percent when δ = 6 and falls to 32 percent when δ =0 .5. This diﬀerence is also
signiﬁcant using the session-level data. (p = .05)
The third main experimental ﬁnding concerns the conditional probabilities of switching in
round 3 in the pairs and triples treatments. Recall that, regardless of the value of the discount
factor or whether players are matched in pairs or triples, the probability of switching in round
3 conditional on not having switched in round 2, q0 =1 .0, while the probability of switching
in round 3 conditional on having switched in round 2, q1 =0 .5 .T h em e a no b s e r v e dv a l u e s
of q0 and q1 in the four sessions conducted of the pairs and triples treatments are reported
in Table 3.
Again, we see that while the point predictions of the theory are not borne out in the
experimental data, the comparative static predictions of the theory ﬁnd strong support.
In particular, the conditional probability q0 is greater than q1 in both the pairs and the
triples treatments. Using the four session level means for q0 and the corresponding session
level means for q1 for the same treatment conditions (same δ, n), we can always reject the
null hypothesis that q0 = q1 in favor of the alternative that q0 >q 1 (p ≤ .05). This ob-
served diﬀerence in switching probabilities conditional on having switched versus not having
9For a description of the robust rank order test, see Sidney Siegel and N. John Castellan Jr. (1988). We
used the robust rank order test for the other hypotheses tested in this section.
12Pr.δ Grouping (n) Predicted Session 1 Session 2 Session 3 Session 4 Mean All
q0 0.5 Pairs 1.0 0.568 0.556 0.518 0.497 0.535
q0 0.5 Triples 1.0 0.505 0.397 0.558 0.572 0.508
q0 6.0 Pairs 1.0 0.700 0.549 0.628 0.672 0.637
q0 6.0 Triples 1.0 0.583 0.577 0.686 0.666 0.628
q1 0.5 Pairs 0.5 0.272 0.401 0.313 0.314 0.325
q1 0.5 Triples 0.5 0.299 0.357 0.401 0.300 0.339
q1 6.0 Pairs 0.5 0.447 0.260 0.346 0.372 0.356
q1 6.0 Triples 0.5 0.298 0.303 0.290 0.332 0.306
Table 3: Predicted and observed mean conditional round-3 switching probabilities across
pairs and triples treatments
switched before (in both the pairs and triples treatments) is our third main experimental
ﬁnding. It supports the theoretical prediction that the third-round switching probability
when both actions have been taken previously is lower than when only one action has been
taken previously.
Our fourth main experimental ﬁnding concerns the eﬀect of varying organization size
(n) on third-round switching probabilities. The third-round switching probabilities do not
appear to change as the size of the organization increases from two to three members.
Speciﬁcally, if we compare the four session mean values for q0 in the case of pairs (as reported
in Table 3) with the corresponding session mean values for q0 in the case of triples (for the
same value of δ =0 .5 or 6) we are unable to reject the null hypotheses that the means come
from the same distribution (both tests yield p-values >. 10). Similarly, if we compare the
four session-level mean values for q1 i nt h ec a s eo fp a i r sw i t ht h ec orresponding session mean
values for q1 i nt h ec a s eo ft r i p l e s( f o rt h es a m ev a l u eo fδ =0 .5o r6 )w ea r ea l s ou n a b l e
to reject the null hypotheses that the means come from the same distribution (p>. 10 for
both tests). This ﬁnding supports the theoretical prediction that round 3-behavior should
be invariant with respect to the size of the organization, i.e. whether n =2o rn =3 .
Our ﬁfth main experimental ﬁnding concerns the eﬀect of varying the discount factor
on third-round switching probabilities. Support for the theoretical prediction that round 3
conditional probabilities are invariant to changes in the discount factor is mixed. On the one
hand, comparing the four session mean values of q0 when δ =0 .5 with the corresponding
values of q0 when δ =6( h o l d i n gn ﬁxed at either 2 or 3), we can reject the null hypothesis
that the q0 values come from the same distribution in favor of the alternative that q0 is higher
13Pr.δ Predicted Session 1 Session 2 Session 3 Session 4 Mean All
q0 0.5 1.0 0.936 0.750 0.692 0.354 0.683
q1 0.5 1.0 0.947 0.955 0.880 0.937 0.930
q (uncond.) 0.5 1.0 0.943 0.944 0.841 0.780 0.877
q0 6.0 1.0 1.000 0.6890 0.739 0.442 0.717
q1 6.0 1.0 1.000 0.9400 0.849 0.975 0.941
q (uncond.) 6.0 1.0 1.000 0.889 0.804 0.788 0.870
Table 4: Predicted and observed mean conditional and unconditional round-3 switching
probabilities in the singles treatments
when δ =6t h a nw h e nδ =0 .5( p ≤ .05 for both tests). On the other hand, comparing
the four session mean values of q1 when δ =0 .5 with the corresponding values of q1 when
δ =6( h o l d i n gn ﬁx e da te i t h e r2o r3 ) ,w ec a n n o tr e j e c tt h en u l lh y p o t h e s i st h a tt h e s eq1
values come from the same distribution (p>. 10). The higher value of q0 when δ =6t h a n
when δ =0 .5 is likely due to the diﬀerence in monetary rewards that players could earn by
achieving the success outcome in round 3 ($6 versus $0.50); this diﬀerence may have made
it more salient to players who had not switched in round 2 (and who had not yet achieved
a success) that their best response was to switch in round 3.
Our sixth main experimental ﬁnding is that in the singles treatments, somewhat anom-
alously, individuals sometimes fail to switch even though it is optimal to switch with proba-
bility 1 in both rounds 2 and 3 to one of the remaining unexplored cells. The mean round-2
switching probabilities from the 4 individual-treatment sessions were given earlier in Table 2.
There we see that when δ =0 .5, the average round-2 switching probability was .875 and
when δ = 6 it is a little lower, .799. While these data depart from the theoretical point
prediction of 1.0, the null hypothesis of no diﬀerence between the two treatments in the
round-2 switching probabilities cannot be rejected using the four session level observations.
(p>. 05). This behavioral anomaly of not switching all the time in the singles treatments
may help explain the departures from the point predictions in the pairs and triples treat-
ments. It suggests that for some individuals the choice of switching probability is not guided
by rational deliberation. If these individuals randomly decide whether or not to switch, with
no bias either way, the observed second-round switching probabilities in the pairs and triples
treatments would be biased away from the point predictions in the direction of switching
with probability .5, and this is what we see in the data.
14The round 3 switching probabilities in the singles treatment are given in Table 4. For
comparison purposes, Table 4 provides the same conditional round 3 switching probabilities
that were reported and examined in the pairs and triples treatment (c.f. Table 3) even though
in the singles treatment, the prediction is that q0 = q1 =1 .0, i.e. the round 3 switching
probability is not conditional on whether a switch was made in round 2. We therefore
also report in Table 4 the unconditional round 3 switching probability, q.10 Whether we
look at the mean unconditional or the mean conditional probabilities, there is no signiﬁcant
diﬀerence in the session-level means for q, q0 or q1 as δ is increased from 0.5t o6( p>. 10),
consistent with theoretical predictions. On the other hand, holding δ ﬁxed at 0.5o r6 ,w e
can reject the null of no diﬀerence in the conditional probabilities in favor of the alternative
that q1 >q 0 (p ≤ .05). Interestingly, while in our data for the pairs and triples treatments,
second and third-round switching probabilities are negatively correlated as theory predicts,
in the singles treatment, these probabilities are positively correlated. It appears that, in the
singles treatment, having made one irrational decision increases the probability of making
another! However, caution is warranted in making much of this ﬁnding as the percentage
of the 10 players who chose not to switch in rounds 2 and/or 3 of the singles treatment is
always rather small (less than 20 percent of subjects on average).
Summarizing, our analysis of the session level mean switching probabilities provides clear
support for the claim that learning in organizations is quite diﬀerent from individual learning;
it seems that in organizations players do take account of the fact that other players are
learning and adjust their probability of switching actions relative to the individual decision-
making environment. They also appear responsive to changes in the discount factor. These
results suggest that the assumption of fully rational, strategic agents provides a reasonable
benchmark for modeling decentralized organizational learning in contrast to the approach
that has been traditionally taken as noted in the introduction.
B. Behavior over time
Thus far we have reported on session-level mean observations across treatments. In this
section we provide a brief characterization of aggregate behavior over time.
10We have veriﬁed that subjects in the singles treatment were switching in round 3 to proﬁles they had
not previously played, e.g. if an individual played XX in round 1, and switched to XY in round 2, then a
“switch” in round 3 was either to YY or YX, and not back to XX. This was the case in 99.8 percent of
all reported instances of switching in round 3 of the sin g l e st r e a t m e n t .T h i si s s u eonly arises in the singles
treatment, where subjects have four rather than two choices.
15Figures 2-3 here.
Our ﬁrst ﬁnding is that, in the pairs and triples treatments, we often observe a sharp
jump in the aggregate round 2 switching probabilities when δ is switched from .5 to 6 (low-
high treatment) or from 6 to .5 (high-low treatment) that is consistent with theoretical
predictions. Figures 2-3 show the evolution of the mean round 2 switching probability over
periods 1-16 for the four pairs and four triples sessions, respectively. In these ﬁgures, sessions
1 and 3 involve the high-low treatment and sessions 2 and 4 involve the low-high treatment.
In Figure 2 we observe that in 3 out of 4 sessions, the mean value of p changes in the
predicted direction at the time that δ is changed. The one exception is pairs session number
3 where the predicted decline in round 2 switching probabilities beginning with period 9 is
not immediately apparent. In Figure 3, we observe that in all 4 sessions, the mean value of
p changes in the predicted direction at the time δ is changed.
As e c o n dﬁnding is that there appears to be little evidence of any signiﬁcant order eﬀects
in the pairs treatments. In particular, the sequence of discount factors we use, low-high
(as in sessions 1 and 3) or high-low (as in sessions 2 and 4) does not appear to bias our
ﬁndings away from the equilibrium predictions in any systematic fashion that is apparent in
Figure 2. By contrast, in the triples treatment, there appears to be some evidence that the
sequence of discount factor choices may matter for how closely aggregate behavior adheres
to the comparative static predictions of the theory. In particular, in the low-high triples
sessions (numbers 1 and 3), consistent with the theory, there is a marked drop-oﬀ in the
round-2 switching probabilities from the ﬁrst to the last 8 periods of each session. In the
high-low triples treatment, counter to the theory, there is much smaller change in the round-2
switching probabilities from the ﬁrst to the last 8 periods of each session.11
Figure 4 here.
Figure 4 shows the evolution of the mean round 2 switching probability over periods
1-16 in the four singles sessions. In this treatment, there should be no change in round 2
switching behavior when δ is changed as the optimal strategy calls on players to switch with
probability 1.0 regardless of the value of δ. Here again, sessions 1 and 3 involved the low-high
treatment while sessions 2 and 4 involved the high-low treatment. In two of the four sessions,
11A more formal test of whether the sequence of discount factors matters in the triples treatment would
require more than the two observations that we have on the low-high and high-low treatments.
16numbers 1 and 2, there is a small change in the mean value of p following the change in the
discount factor, but it does not appear to be sustained beyond a couple of periods. Such
changes are less clear in the other two sessions, numbers 3 and 4. This is consistent with the
discussion surrounding Table 2, where we found that the session-level mean values for p in
the singles treatment when δ =0 .5w e r en o td i ﬀerent from the session-level mean values for
p when δ =6 .
With regard to the behavior of the mean values of q0 and q1, the prediction of the theory is
that these probabilities should remain invariant over time to changes in the discount factor in
all treatments. In the pairs and triples treatments, we should see q0 =1a n dq1 =0 .5, while
in the singles treatment, q0 = q1 = q =1 .0. Consistent with the discussion of Table 3, we do
not observe signiﬁcant or sustained changes in the values of these conditional probabilities
when the discount factor changes, that is, the graphs look similar to the those for p in the
singles case.
Summarizing, the time path of the mean switching probabilities is sometimes volatile,
but appears to be broadly consistent with the predictions of the theory. In particular, there
appears to be a marked change in the round 2 switching probabilities immediately following
a change in the discount factor in most of the pairs and triples sessions. By contrast, there
appears to be little change in the round 2 switching probabilities in the singles treatments or
in the round 3 conditional switching probabilities following a change in the discount factor,
which is consistent with theoretical predictions.
V. Behavioral Models of Decision-Making
Thus far, our analysis of the experimental subjects’ switching behavior has been with refer-
ence to the Nash equilibrium point predictions under the maintained assumption of perfect
rationality. In this section we relax the latter assumption and consider the predictions of
three alternative models of boundedly rational decision-making. In particular, we consider:
1) an equilibrium-plus-noise model; 2) a more sophisticated, stochastic equilibrium model
of decision-making known as quantal-response equilibrium (QRE) (see, e.g., Richard D.
McKelvey and Thomas R. Palfrey (1995, 1998)); and ﬁnally, 3) a non-equilibrium model of
decision-making known as ‘step-’ or ‘level-k’ reasoning (see, e.g., Dale O. Stahl and Paul
W. Wilson (1994, 1995), Rosemarie Nagel (1995), Teck-Hua Ho, Camerer and Keith Weigelt
(1998), Miguel A. Costa-Gomes, Crawford and Bruno Broseta (2001), Costa-Gomes and
17Crawford (2006), and Crawford and Nagore Iriberri (2007)).
A. Equilibrium Plus Noise
Perhaps the simplest way of reconciling the model with the fact that there is noise in the
data is to consider a variant in which the predicted round 2 switching probability, p(η), is a
weighted average of the theoretical, equilibrium prediction p, and a purely random switching
probability of 1
2,t h a ti s ,t h eequilibrium-plus-noise model speciﬁes that subjects switch in





where η ∈ [0,1]. If we further impose the (sensible) restriction that the weight assigned to
equilibrium, η, is the same for the conditional and unconditional switching probabilities of
round 3, we can estimate η using the method of maximum likelihood. Under the equilibrium-
plus-noise model, the predicted round 3 switching probability following no switch in round
2i s :
q0(η)=ηq0 +( 1− η)
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and the predicted round 3 switching probability following a switch in round 2 is:













Since q1(η) does not depend on the parameter η, the corresponding factor in the likelihood
function is constant and can be ignored when maximizing the likelihood function.
To construct the likelihood function, let ω be the total number of round 2 observations,
ω0 the total number of round 3 observations following “no switch and no success in round
2” and ω1 the total number of round 3 observations following a “switch in round 2, but no
success in round 2.” Then denote by σ the actual number of round 2 switches, σ0 the actual
number of round 3 switches following “no switch and no success” in round 2 and σ1 the
actual number of round 3 switches following a “switch in round 2, but no success in round














18LR Test Pr. LR Test
Treatment: Pairs ˆ p ˆ q0 ˆ η Statistic Stat. under H0
All periods, δ =6 0.427 0.646 0.292 42.239 Pr < 0.001
First 4 periods, δ =6 0.429 0.644 0.287 20.575 Pr < 0.001
Last 4 periods, δ =6 0.426 0.649 0.298 21.680 Pr < 0.001
All periods, δ =0 .5 0.584 0.640 0.280 34.252 Pr < 0.001
First 4 periods, δ =0 .5 0.563 0.604 0.208 9.705 Pr = 0.002
Last 4 periods, δ =0 .5 0.607 0.678 0.356 27.111 Pr < 0.001
Table 5: Equilibrium-Plus-Noise Model, Pairs Treatment: Maximum Likelihood Estimates
and Likelihood Ratio Test Results
using pooled data from all sessions of a given treatment.
The results of this maximum likelihood (ML) estimation are given in Tables 5-6 which
report the estimated values ˆ p,ˆ q0,a n dˆ η using data from all eight periods, or for the ﬁrst four
or the last four periods of all sessions of a treatment (δ value) in the pairs (Table 5) and triples
(Table 6) cases. Also reported are the results of a likelihood ratio test that compares the
likelihood function for the unrestricted, ML estimator for the equilibrium-plus-noise model
with the likelihood function from a purely random version of that model where we impose
the restriction that η = 0 and used the same number of observations as for the unrestricted
model. Speciﬁcally, the last two columns of Tables 5-6 report the likelihood ratio (LR)
test statistic, (LR Stat ≡− 2ln ,w h e r e  is the ratio of the unrestricted to the restricted
likelihood functions) and the probability of observing such as test statistic under the null
hypothesis (H0)o fn od i ﬀerence between the unrestricted, equilibrium-plus-noise model and
the restricted purely random switching version of the model. The LR test statistic has a χ2
distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the number of restrictions, in this case, 1.
Notice ﬁrst that according to the LR test, the equilibrium-plus-noise model outperforms
the purely random switching model in three of the four treatments. The one exception
occurs for the triples, δ =0 .5 treatment, where we cannot reject the null hypothesis of
no diﬀerence at any conventional level of signiﬁcance. Notice further that the comparative
static implications of the theory ﬁnd support in the equilibrium-plus-noise estimates: the
estimated values of p are in, both the pairs and triples treatment, greater when δ =0 .5t h a n
when δ = 6, and in the pairs treatment, there is not much diﬀerence in the estimated value
of q0 as δ is varied; by contrast, for the triples, δ =0 .5 treatment, there is some diﬀerence in
estimates of q0 with changes in δ; q0 is estimated to be lower when δ = .5t h a nw h e nδ =6( a
19LR Test Pr. LR Test
Treatment: Triples ˆ p ˆ q0 ˆ η Statistic Stat. under H0
All periods, δ =6 0.359 0.642 0.283 61.395 Pr < 0.001
First 4 periods, δ =6 0.350 0.651 0.301 34.321 Pr < 0.001
Last 4 periods, δ =6 0.367 0.633 0.266 27.327 Pr < 0.001
All periods, δ =0 .5 0.501 0.502 0.003 0.004 Pr = 0.950
First 4 periods, δ =0 .5 0.515 0.530 0.059 0.519 Pr = 0.471
Last 4 periods, δ =0 .5 0.487 0.474 -0.053 0.408 Pr = 0.523
Table 6: Equilibrium-Plus-Noise Model, Triples Treatment: Maximum Likelihood Estimates
and Likelihood Ratio Test Results
ﬁnding that is nevertheless consistent with the experimental data—see Table 3). Regarding
the ˆ η estimates, we note two things. First, in our estimation, of the equilibrium-plus-noise
model, η was not restricted to lie in the interval [0,1]. Nevertheless, with one exception,
the maximum likelihood estimates for η always lie within this interval, giving some support
to the notion that switching probabilities might be appropriately modeled as a mixture of
equilibrium and noise. Not surprisingly, the exception occurs for the last four periods of
the triples, δ =0 .5 treatment, an instance where, as note above, the equilibrium-plus-noise
model does no better than the random switching model. Notice second, that the weight
on equilibrium, the estimated value of η, is low, approximately 0.3 for the pairs treatment
under δ =0 .5a n dδ = 6 and for the triples treatment under δ = 6, and it is near zero in
the triples, δ =0 .5c a s e .T h i sﬁnding mainly conﬁrms that the switching probabilities p and
q0 deviate from equilibrium in the direction of 0.5 (i.e., random switching), a fact that can
also be ascertained from looking at the actual aggregate switching frequencies relative to the
equilibrium predictions as reported earlier in Tables 2 - 3.
Summarizing, the equilibrium-plus-noise model provides a simple measure of the “close-
ness” of the data to equilibrium predictions. We have found that the equilibrium-plus-noise
model is a better ﬁt to the data than purely random decision-making for three of our four
treatments (n, δ). Further, under this view of behavior, most of our equilibrium compara-
tive statics predictions continue to hold. On the other hand, the estimated weight given to
the equilibrium prediction in this model is low, and essentially zero in the triples, δ =0 .5
treatment. An obvious diﬃculty with the equilibrium-plus-noise model is that it assumes
that otherwise rational players ignore the irrationality of others; this problem is addressed
by the quantal response equilibrium (QRE) model considered in the next section.
20B. Quantal Response Equilibrium
In a QRE, players do not play best responses to their beliefs; instead they play “noisy” or
“stochastic” best responses, rationally taking into account the noise in other players’ strate-
gies as well; the latter is what distinguishes QRE from the equilibrium-plus-noise model. In
QRE, the noise in players’ strategies is assumed to follow a speciﬁc distribution; in the case
of the logit choice rule that we use, the distribution is log Weibull. The resulting QRE is
called a logit equilibrium. In this section we use the experimental data to estimate a logit
equilibrium model using the method of maximum likelihood. In addition to considering how
the switching probabilities implied by the logit model compare with the theoretical predic-
tions in the pairs and triples cases, we will also test whether the logit model’s predictions
diﬀer from purely random switching behavior.
We impose attainability constraints, i.e., we ignore the label of the ﬁrst-round choice and
focus on equilibria that are symmetric across players. The QRE is obtained using expected
payoﬀs and a logit-choice rule. Speciﬁcally, for a particular game (e.g., pairs or triples) and



















i represent expected payoﬀsf r o ma c t i o ni, switching (s) or not switching (n)
that may also condition on the state j (0=no prior switch, 1=prior switch). These expected
payoﬀ values are deﬁned in the Appendix. We write the solution of this system of equations
as (p(λ),q 0(λ),q 1(λ)) and maximize the likelihood function over diﬀerent values of λ.
As in the equilibrium-plus-noise model, ω denotes the total number of round 2 observa-
tions, ω0 the total number of round 3 observations following “no switch and no success in
round 2” and ω1 is the total number of round 3 observations following a “switch in round 2
but no success in round 2.” As before, σ is the actual number of round 2 switches, σ0 the
actual number of round 3 switches following “no switch and no success in round 2” and σ1
the actual number of round 3 switches following a “switch in round 2 but no success in round
21LR Test Pr. LR Test
Treatment: Pairs ˆ p ˆ q0 ˆ λ Statistic Stat. under H0
All periods, δ =6 0.476 0.667 0.449 35.352 Pr < 0.001
First 4 periods, δ =6 0.477 0.660 0.427 16.307 Pr < 0.001
Last 4 periods, δ =6 0.474 0.673 0.471 19.109 Pr < 0.001
All periods, δ =0 .5 0.588 0.623 3.260 37.785 Pr < 0.001
First 4 periods, δ =0 .5 0.570 0.592 2.414 11.602 Pr < 0.001
Last 4 periods, δ =0 .5 0.606 0.659 4.258 28.301 Pr < 0.001
Table 7: Quantal Response Equilibrium Model, Pairs Treatment: Maximum Likelihood
Estimates and Likelihood Ratio Test Results
2.”








In maximizing this likelihood function, we again used pooled data from all sessions of a given
treatment (n, δ). The value of q1 is 0.5 in any logit equilibrium of our model. We therefore
maximize a truncated likelihood function (just as we did in the case of the equilibrium-plus-
noise model), which yields maximum likelihood estimates for p and q0 only.
The maximum likelihood estimates ˆ p,ˆ q0,a n dˆ λ for the pairs and triples treatments are
shown in Tables 7-8 using data from all eight periods, or from the ﬁr s tf o u ro rt h el a s tf o u r
periods of all sessions of a treatment (δ value). We again report the results of a likelihood
ratio test that compares the likelihood function from the unrestricted, ML estimator of
the QRE model with the likelihood function from a purely random switching version of
that model where λ was restricted to be 0 and where we have used the same number of
observations as for the unrestricted model. Speciﬁcally, we report the LR test statistic and
the probability of observing that test statistic (which is distributed χ2 with 1 degree of
freedom), under the null hypothesis (H0) that the unrestricted model provides no better ﬁt
to the data than the restricted (purely random switching) model.
Consider ﬁrst the estimates for the pairs, δ =6o rδ = .5 treatments, as reported in
Table 7. For these treatments, the LR test indicates we can reject H0 (the null no diﬀerence
between the QRE model and the restricted, random switching model). Consistent with the
comparative static predictions of the theory and the data, the QRE estimates for p are lower
in the pairs, δ = 6 treatment than in the pairs, δ =0 .5 treatment. Similarly, consistent
22LR Test Pr. LR Test
Treatment: Triples ˆ p ˆ q0 ˆ λ Statistic Stat. under H0
All periods, δ =6 0.449 0.448 -0.242 4.551 Pr = 0.033
First 4 periods, δ =6 0.436 0.437 -0.288 3.320 Pr = 0.068
Last 4 periods, δ =6 0.460 0.458 -0.197 1.465 Pr = 0.226
All periods, δ =0 .5 0.505 0.503 0.178 0.062 Pr = 0.803
First 4 periods, δ =0 .5 0.512 0.507 0.411 0.145 Pr = 0.703
Last 4 periods, δ =0 .5 0.496 0.500 -0.015 0.002 Pr = 0.964
Table 8: Quantal Response Equilibrium Model, Triples Treatment: Maximum Likelihood
Estimates and Likelihood Ratio Test Results
with the theory and the data, the QRE estimates of q0 in the pairs treatment do not change
much as the value of δ changes. A comparison of the QRE pairs estimates with the actual
mean frequencies (over all periods) for p and q0, as reported in Tables 2-3, suggests that
subjects were close to playing according to the estimated QRE in the pairs treatment. We
note further that the QRE estimates of p and q0 for the pairs treatment are quite similar
to the equilibrium-plus-noise model estimates for the pairs treatment (compare Tables 5
and 7). Finally, we note that while the estimates of λ in the pairs treatment display some
variation, they are all greater than zero; larger, positive values for λ are associated with
greater rationality in decision-making while a λ equal to zero indicates random-decision
making.
Consider next the QRE estimates for the triples, δ =6a n dδ = .5 treatments as reported
in Table 8. Consistent with the theory and the data, the QRE estimates for p are lower when
δ =6t h a nw h e nδ = .5. However, inconsistent with the theory and the data, the estimates
of q0 are lower when δ =6t h a nw h e nδ = .5. Furthermore, the LR test results suggest
that for all samples of the triples, δ = .5 treatment, as well as for the last 4 periods of the
triples δ = 6 treatment, we cannot reject H0, that the restricted, random switching model
provides as likely an explanation of the data as the QRE model. Consistent with the latter
ﬁnding, notice that the estimates for λ in the triples treatment are much closer to zero than
in the comparable pairs treatment and are often slightly negative; we did not restrict our
estimates of the QRE model parameter λ, just as we did not restrict our estimates of η in the
equilibrium-plus-noise model. (Recall a similar ﬁnding for the equilibrium-plus-noise model,
where estimates of η were closer to zero or even negative in the triples, δ = .5 treatment).
One interpretation of these low λ estimates is that subjects in the triples treatment found
23their decision problem more challenging than did subjects in the pairs treatment. Comparing
the QRE estimates for the triples treatment with the equilibrium-plus-noise estimates for
this same treatment, we observe that for the δ = 6 case, the equilibrium-plus-noise estimates
of p and q0 are somewhat closer to the mean switching frequencies found in the data than are
the QRE estimates, while for the triples, δ = .5 treatment, the opposite ﬁnding obtains. We
conclude that QRE does not appear to oﬀer any improvement over the equilibrium-plus-noise
model in explaining the data from our experiment.
Summarizing, QRE is a generalization of Nash equilibrium to the case of noisy best
responses where noise enters via a logistic-choice function transformation of theoretical ex-
pected payoﬀs and players take account of this noise in formulating best responses. We
found that the QRE estimates for our pairs treatment improve upon a model of purely ran-
dom switching behavior. Also for the pairs treatment, the QRE estimates of p and q0 are
consistent with the comparative static implications of the theory and bear some resemblance
to the actual switching frequencies observed in the data. However, the same cannot be said
for QRE estimates using data from the triples treatment, where QRE estimates of q0 are
inconsistent with both the comparative static implications of the theory and the data.
C. Level-k Analysis
Finally, we consider the ﬁt of a non-equilibrium behavioral model known as ‘level-k analysis’
to our experimental data. We suppose there are three player types. The lowest, Level 0
(L0) players switch randomly in every round. The next highest, Level 1 (L1)p l a y e r sp l a y
a best response to the L0 types, and the highest, Level 2 (L2)p l a y e r sp l a yab e s tr e s p o n s e
to the L1 types. Our restriction to just three level types is in line with prior ﬁndings. For
instance, Camerer, Ho and Juin-Kuan Chong (2004) ﬁnd that an average level of 1.5 ﬁts
the data from many games using their closely related ‘cognitive hierarchy’ model (in which
L2 player types best respond to a Poisson mix of L1 and L0 player types). Crawford and
Iriberri (2007) restrict themselves to L0, L1 and L2 players and ﬁnd a higher proportion of
L1 than either L2 or L0 players. Costa-Gomes and Crawford (2006) ﬁnd roughly twice as
many L1 types as L2 types.
The predictions of level-k analysis in our search-for-success game are found by considering
the payoﬀs earned by the various player types from following reduced normal form strategies.
T a b l e9a b o v es h o w st h ep a y o ﬀ from play of the reduced normal form set of pure strategies
24Strategies of Player 2


































Table 9: Payoﬀs from play of pure strategies against one another in the 2-player game.
Player strategies are represented by pairs of values, S=Switch, N=No Switch, e.g., ‘SN’ is
the strategy Switch in round 2, No Switch in round 3.
in the two-player game, Switch (S)o rN oS w i t c h( N)i np e r i o d s2a n d3a g a i n s to n ea n o t h e r .
For instance, the strategy pair SS (switch in round 2 and switch back in round 3) against
itself has an expected payoﬀ of 1/3. Given that L0 types randomize uniformly, it follows
that for δ = .5, L1 players are indiﬀerent between SS and SN, and strictly prefer these two
strategies to all others. By contrast, L2 players who best respond to L1 players’ decision to
switch in round 2, strictly prefer NS to all other strategies. For δ =6 ,i fw eo n c ea g a i n
assume that L0 players randomize uniformly, then L1 players strictly prefer NS to all other
strategies, and given this behavior, L2 players’ are indiﬀerent between either SS and SN,
but strictly prefer these strategies to all others.
Notice that, while the level-k analysis yields ambiguous predictions concerning round 3
switching behavior, it yields an unambiguous prediction regarding round 2 behavior in the
2-player game: L1 types should switch in round 2 when δ =0 .5a n ds h o u l dn o ts w i t c hi n
round 2 when δ =6 ,a n dL2 types should follow the precise opposite strategy, not switching
in round 2 when δ =0 .5a n ds w i t c h i n gi nr o u n d2w h e nδ =6 .
We can also apply level-k analysis to the 3-player, 2-success game (our triples treatment).
The payoﬀ matrix from all diﬀerent combinations of reduced normal form strategies in our
three-player search-for success game with 2 successes is given in Table 10, which can be read
the same way as Table 9, except that the columns now report pure strategy pairs for two of
the three players. Analysis of these payoﬀsf o rt h et h r e e - p e r s o ng a m eu n d e rl e v e l - kr e a s o n i n g
reveals that L1 and L2 types should behave in the precisely the same manner as predicted
for the two-player game.
Table 11 reports results from a level-k analysis of round 2 switching decisions in both
the pairs and triples sessions; as the level-k predictions for round 3 are ambiguous, we use
25Strategies of Players 2-3
SS SS SS SS SN SN SN SN
SS SN NS NN SS SN NS NN
Strategies SS 2
7 * * 2
7 * * * *
of SN * * * * * 2
7 * 2
7
Player NS * * * * * * * *
1 NN 2
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6. Player strategies are represented by pairs of values, S=Switch, N=No Switch,
e.g., ‘NS’ is the strategy No Switch in round 2, Switch in round 3.
Implied Actual Implied Actual
Percent Percent Percent Rnd 2 Rnd 2 Rnd 2 Rnd 2
Treatment Subjects Subjects Subjects Sw Freq Sw Freq Sw Freq Sw Freq
-Session Level 0 Level 1 Level 2 δ =0 .5 δ =0 .5 δ =6 δ =6
Pairs-1 0.15 0.55 0.30 0.63 0.66 0.38 0.45
Pairs-2 0.15 0.70 0.15 0.78 0.56 0.23 0.42
Pairs-3 0.05 0.50 0.45 0.53 0.56 0.48 0.48
Pairs-4 0.20 0.75 0.05 0.85 0.77 0.15 0.35
Pairs 1-4 0.14 0.63 0.24 0.69 0.64 0.31 0.43
Triples-1 0.27 0.53 0.20 0.67 0.47 0.34 0.30
Triples-2 0.13 0.53 0.33 0.60 0.49 0.40 0.44
Triples-3 0.20 0.60 0.20 0.70 0.51 0.30 0.22
Triples-4 0.20 0.60 0.20 0.70 0.62 0.30 0.32
Triples 1-4 0.20 0.57 0.33 0.67 0.52 0.33 0.32
Table 11: Level-type Analysis of Data from Round 2 Decisions in the Pairs and Triples
Treatments
26only round 2 data in our analysis. Assignment of level type 1 or type 2, L1 or L2,w a s
made as follows. As noted above, when δ =0 .5i nb o t ht h ep a i r sa n dt r i p l e st r e a t m e n t s ,L1
players strictly prefer switching in round 2 to not switching while L2 players strictly prefer
not switching in round 2 to switching. When δ = 6 in both the pairs and triples treatments,
these predictions are precisely reversed: L1 players strictly prefer not switching in round 2
to switching, while L2 players strictly prefer switching in round 2 to not switching. Thus, we
labeled each subject a ‘1’ if their round 2 switching behavior was in accord with L1 play and a
‘2’ if their round 2 behavior was in accord with L2 play. Using the 16 numerical assignments
for each subject (across both the 8 periods of the δ =0 .5 treatment and the 8 periods of
the δ = 6 treatment), we used the modal assignment to identify each subject’s type (either 1
or 2). In the event where the mode was indeterminate - exactly 8 of an individual subject’s
choices were in accord with level 1 play while the other 8 were in accord with level 2 play,
we classiﬁed that subject as a level 0, L0 type.
Using these assignment rules, the distribution of player types is as given in the ﬁrst
three columns of Table 11. A striking ﬁnding across all sessions of both treatments is that
the ratio of L1 to L2 types is, on average, approximately 2 to 1, which, as noted earlier, is
consistent with prior ﬁndings, e.g., Costa-Gomes and Crawford (2006). Further, we ﬁnd that
a non-negligible fraction (an average of 17 percent) of our subjects can be typed as level L0.
Using these frequencies for the three player types, we can obtain “level-k” predictions for
the actual switching frequencies in the δ =0 .5a n dδ = 6 versions of the pairs and triples
treatments. Speciﬁcally, when δ =0 .5, the frequency of switching in round 2 should equal the
percentage of L1 t y p e sp l u s1 / 2t i m e st h ep e r c e n t a g eo fL0 (random) types. This is computed
in the fourth column of Table 11. When δ = 6, the frequency of switching in round 2 should
equal the percentage of L2 types + 1/2 times the percentage of L0 types; this prediction
i sg i v e ni nt h es i x t hc o l u m no fT a b l e1 1 .T h eﬁfth and seventh columns report the actual
switching frequencies reproduced from Table 2 for comparison purposes. The main ﬁnding
here is that the correlation between the level-k predicted round 2 switching frequencies and
the actual round 2 switching frequencies is strongly positive. In the pairs treatment, the
correlation across both the δ =0 .5a n dδ = 6 cases is .91, and in the triples treatment, the
correlation across both the δ =0 .5a n dδ = 6 cases is .70. The high correlation coeﬃcient
suggest that the level-k model has some predictive power for round 2 switching decisions in
both the pairs and triples treatments.
27Summarizing, the level-k predictions are unambiguous only for round 2 of the search-for-
success game. Nevertheless, it appears that a level-k analysis provides a reasonable, non-
equilibrium characterization of round 2 switching behavior. Level-k thinking is frequently
declared particularly appropriate for explaining behavior in ﬁrst encounters with a game. In
our setting, it appears that it helps explain behavior equally well after repeated exposure
to the game. This could be result of the fact that players get very little feedback between
instances of the search-for success game. Another possible explanation is that in the search-
for success game, the level-k predictions do not diﬀer much from the symmetric equilibrium
prediction.
VI. Individual behavior
Finally, it is of interest to consider the behavior of individual subjects. In this section we
focus exclusively on individual switching behavior in round 2, as behavior in this round is
predicted to vary with changes in the value of δ and the group size. We ﬁr s ta s kw h e t h e rt h e
diﬀerences in round 2 switching frequencies across the two diﬀerent δ values and group sizes
(as reported in Table 2) reﬂect changes in each individual’s behavior or whether the aggregate
diﬀerences are due only to a subset of individuals. Figure 5 provides striking evidence that
the distribution of individual round 2 switching behavior is quite distinct across treatments.
This ﬁgure shows the empirical (weighted) cumulative distribution of round 2 switching
frequencies using data from all four sessions of the four treatments, i.e., for each switching
frequency it reports the proportion of all individuals who switched with that frequency or
with a lower frequency. Notice that the cumulative frequency distribution for the pairs
δ =0 .5 treatment ﬁrst order stochastically dominates that of the triples δ =0 .5 treatment.
The latter ﬁrst order stochastically dominates the pairs, δ = 6 treatment, which in turn
ﬁrst order stochastically dominates the triples, δ = 6 treatment. This ordering is precisely
in accord with the comparative static implication of the symmetric equilibrium predictions,
which (you will recall) predict that round 2 switching frequencies should be .80, .75, .25
and 0 across these four treatments, respectively. A two-sample, two-sided Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test conﬁrms that round 2 switching frequencies are signiﬁcantly greater in the
pairs treatment when δ =0 .5( δ = 6) relative to the triples treatment when δ =0 .5( δ =6 )
(Pr ≤ .025 in both comparisons).
Figure 5 here.
28Second, we examine how individual behavior relates to the symmetric Nash equilibrium
prediction. In addressing this question, we calculated each subject’s round 2 switching
frequency in the 8 periods played under δ =0 .5 and in the 8 periods played under δ =6
under either the pairs or the triples treatments. Thus for each subject i,w eh a v ea na v e r a g e
round 2 switching frequency pair, (p.5
i ,p 6
i). In Figure 6 we use a bubble chart format to plot
these frequency pairs using all data from the four sessions of a treatment (pairs, triples).
The size of each bubble indicates the number of individual observations of that frequency
pair; the smallest bubble corresponds to a single, individual observation. The top panel of
Figure 6 shows the individual round 2 switching frequencies in the pairs treatment while the
bottom panel does the same for the triples treatment. We have also indicated in Figure 6 the
location of the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium and we remind the reader of the overall
average round 2 switching frequencies (averaging over all subjects) as previously reported in
Table 2.
Figure 6 here.
Figure 6 reveals several interesting ﬁndings. First, there is considerable heterogeneity
in the individual subjects’ switching frequencies. Bear in mind, however, that in our envi-
ronment, where individuals interact anonymously in a population setting, our equilibrium
prediction can be realized as the population distribution over heterogeneous individual strate-
gies, which themselves may be either pure or mixed (see, e.g., Ariel Rubinstein (1991)).12
Second, and more importantly, a majority of the mass of the individual frequencies lies below
the 45 degree line in both panels of Figure 6 which is consistent with the location of the
symmetric Nash equilibrium in both treatments (pairs, triples) and suggests that individual
subjects were taking into account the impact on expected payoﬀs from a change in the value
of δ. Finally, notice that in the pairs case, there is more mass associated with p.5
i =1t h a n
in the triples case and, symmetrically, in the triples case, there is more mass associated with
p6
i = 0 than in the pairs case. Indeed, in the pairs treatment, a sizeable subset of subjects
(16/80) appear to be following a heuristic switching strategy of the form (p.5
i ,p 6
i)=( 1 ,x)
where x ∈ [0,1]. Similarly, a sizeable subset of subjects (13/60) in the triples treatment
appear to have been using a heuristic switching strategy of the form (p.5
i ,p 6
i)=( x,0) where
12This parallels the Bayesian interpretation of Nash equilibrium that was articulated by John C. Harsanyi
(1973) (using incomplete information) and later by Robert J. Aumann (1987) (without recourse to incomplete
information), according to which a player’s mixed strategy is an expression of the other players’ ignorance
of his (pure) strategy.
29x ∈ [0,1]. These heuristics are roughly consistent with the play of level 1 (L1)t y p e s ;r e c a l l
from our level-k analysis that in both the pairs and triples treatments, a L1 type would switch
in round 2 when δ =0 .5 and not switch when δ =6 ,i . e . ,t h eL1 strategy is (p.5
i ,p 6
i)=( 1 ,0).
By contrast, there appear to be no pure level 2 (L2) types, who would always play the strat-
egy opposite to L1 types, i.e., (p.5
i ,p 6
i)=( 0 ,1), though there is some mass above the 45
degree line in both the pairs and triples treatments. Finally Figure 6 reveals evidence for
level 0 (L0) types who switch with probability 0.5 for both values of δ, as evidenced by the
mass at (p.5
i ,p 6
i)=( .5,.5) in both the pairs and triples treatments.
VII. Conclusion
We have experimentally tested a stylized model of organizational learning that assumes
rational agents, sparse information and decentralized learning. In the random matching
environment studied here, we ﬁnd that the comparative static implications of the unique
symmetric equilibrium are largely conﬁrmed by our experimental data. The main qualitative
insight from our experiment is that the rationality assumption has predictive power; the
common practice in the organizational learning literature of assuming boundedly rational
actors may be unwarranted. Speciﬁcally, we observe that team members cope with the
confounding eﬀects of the simultaneous learning of others by changing actions less frequently
than individuals, or teams of smaller size. Furthermore, we ﬁnd that team members switch
actions less frequently if the future becomes relatively more important. These are striking
ﬁndings and to our knowledge they constitute the ﬁrst direct evidence yet provided that
learning individuals take into account the simultaneous learning of other agents.
We view these results as providing an important benchmark for future work. We plan
to build on this investigation by changing the basic environment so that either tacit or
explicit coordination of learning strategies becomes easier. As for tacit coordination, we
expect that with ﬁxed matchings and public information about the actions taken by team
members, subjects would be more likely to develop routines,w h i c hw o u l dc o r r e s p o n dt o
the asymmetric, but eﬃcient equilibria (where the number of strategy proﬁles explored in
T periods was maximized). Explicit coordination via pre-play communication similarly is
likely to increase eﬃciency, and one could try to determine the relative value of ‘directives’
(one-way communication) versus ‘committee meetings’ (two-way communication).
30Appendix: Expected Payoﬀ Calculations for QRE Esti-
mation
The quantal response equilibria of interest have the form (p,q0,q 1) and are derived using
expected payoﬀs and the logit choice rule. Here we provide details about the expected
payoﬀ calculations for the two and three player cases. The notation here is the same as in
the paper.
F o rt h et w op l a y e rc a s e ,d e ﬁne:
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Similarly, for the three-player case, deﬁne:
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Figure 1: Predicted and Mean Round 2 Switching Probabilities Over All 













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Pairs, delta=.5 Triples, delta=.5 Pairs, delta=6 Triples, delta=6
Figure 5: Cumulative Frequency Distribution of Individual Round 2 
Switching Frequencies Across TreatmentsIndividual Frequencies of Round 2 Switching



























Individual Frequencies of Round 2 Switching





























Figure 6: Individual Switching Frequencies as a function of delta. Pooled data 
from all four Pairs (top) and Triples (bottom) sessions.